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The court disagreed with Tussy-Garber's
contention that AIDS can easily be avoided and called
her arguments "overly simplistic." The court noted that
infection may occur in utero, through prophylactic
failure, through partners who "dissemble" and through
tainted blood. The court stated that precedent disfavors
recovery of emotional distress damages in connection
with actions alleging economic damages. In contrast,
precedent favors recovery in cases, such as medical
malpractice, which involve personal injury. The court
defined the question to be determined: What is "the
threshold for a personal injury which, under Potter,
would sustain parasitic damages for emotional distress."

Court creates new standard for recovery
In conclusion, the court denied summary
adjudication, stating that the lower court did not use the
correct legal standard when it applied the area of
physical risk or physical impact test to Tussy-Garber's
situation. The court held that a plaintiff must sustain a
detrimental bodily change to recover parasitic damages
for emotional distress. Therefore, the court granted
Macy's motion barring Tussy-Garber from recovery for
emotional distress damages.

Real estate seller wins battle over financing
condition
by Sara E. Neff
Real estate buyers and
sellers must now expressly contract
the extension of financing conditions in real estate agreements. The
Massachusetts Court of Appeals
recently rejected the notion that
financing conditions in property
sales contracts implicitly extend
proportionally with renegotiated
closing dates in Churgin v. Hobbie,
655 N.E.2d 1280 (Mass. App. Ct.
1995). In an action between a buyer
and a seller arising from a real estate
contract, the appellate court reversed
a trial court's judgment in favor of
the buyer and concluded that the
extension of the closing date under
agreement did not extend the
deadline for exercising a mortgage
financing condition and that the
buyer's failure to give the seller
timely notice of an inability to
obtain financing was not an act of
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bad faith or unfair practice.

Overconfident buyer
failed to exercise option
On July 8, 1991, the seller,
Dr. Churgin, entered into an
agreement with a fellow veterinarian, Dr. Hobbie, to sell the commercial property she maintained in
Wenham, Massachusetts for
$375,000. The back page of the
agreement included two extension
forms following the signature
blocks: one for an "Extension for
Financing" and another for an
"Extension for Performance." In the
sale agreement, Dr. Hobbie conditioned his performance on obtaining
a mortgage loan of $300,000 "on or
before 45 days of closing." The real
estate agreement, which made time
of the essence, set a closing date of

January 8, 1992. In order to exercise
the financing option and reclaim a
$46,875 deposit, Dr. Hobbie was
obliged to notify Dr. Churgin on or
before 45 days from the closing date
that he was unable to obtain the
requiste financing. As a result,
November 24, 1991, was established
as the cutoff date for exercising the
financing option .
Dr. Hobbie felt confident
that his net worth and "track record"
would enable him to secure financing. As a result, he neither applied
for mortgage financing by the option
deadline of November 24, 1991, nor
exercised his right to withdraw from
the agreement via the financing
option. After receiving a letter dated
December 10, 1991, which expressed Dr. Churgin's desire to close
on the agreed upon date, Dr. Hobbie
began discussions with a potential
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bank lender only to discover that the
bank would require a site assessment
of the sale property for hazardous or
toxic pollutants. Although aware
that the property had once been used
as a gas station, Dr. Hobbie had not
considered any implications that
might arise from this fact.
In a letter dated January 2,
1992, Dr. Hobbie indicated the
requisite hazardous substance
inspection might take several
months to complete, and, as a result,
he would not be able to
perform on the contract
date of January 8. Dr.
Hobbie requested an
extension until such
time as financing
arrangements could be
completed and noted he
would notify her as
so cl
soon as he secured a
for
the
date
projected
closing . On January 7,
1992, both sides
prepared an extension
document using the
forms on the original
purchase and sale
agreement, establishing
March 8, 1992, as the
new performance date.
The new agreement
struck the financing extension
provision.
Approximately a week
later, Dr. Hobbie's environmental
consultant informed him that
automobile parts might be buried on
the site. In a letter dated January 22,
1992, Dr. Hobbie gave Dr. Churgin
notice that he was unable to secure
financing and that he would like to
have his deposit returned. At the
time of the letter, Dr. Hobbie's
mortgage application was still under

review; however, it was subsequently rejected on March 5, 1992,
due to the likelihood of site contamination. Dr. Churgin declined to
authorize the escrowee, her attorney,
to return the deposit.

Appellate court rejects
trial court's interpretation
of unexpressed intentions
Dr. Churgin brought an
interpleader action to the trial court,

imputed to the seller he was acting
as her agent.
On appeal, the court
rejected the trial judge's interpretation of Dr. Hobbie's "unexpressed
intentions." The appellate court
noted that by the time Dr. Hobbie
first raised the prospect of the need
for an extension in his letter of
January 2, 1992, the time for
exercising the financing option
extention already expired. If "a new
financing condition were to be
introduced, it is reasonable to expect
that this would be
expressly requested and
expressly incorporated
in the documentation of
e

In re jecting the logic of th
trial judge, the appellate c:ourt
state d that the "parties have

extension." However,
the court concluded the
opposite occurred when
Dr. Hobbie asked only
"for an extension until
such time as financing
arrangements [could be]
completed," not so a
commitment might be
obtained. The court
concluded that Dr.
Hobbie's specific
written repair requests
were not the language
of a buyer who believed
the transaction to still
be conditional.
In rejecting the logic of the
trial judge, the appellate court stated
that the "parties have so clearly
expressed themselves in their
documentation that a court should
not undertake to be wiser than the
parties." To do so would have the
effect of turning the financing
condition here into an open-ended
option for the buyer and of removing the unilateral leverage the seller
must have as compensation for

early expressed
ther iselves in their
doCU[mentation that a cou rt
shou Id not undertake to t
wise r than the parties."
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which ruled in favor of Dr. Hobbie.
The trial court reasoned Dr. Hobbie
must have intended to extend the
financing condition because knew of
the possibility a hazardous waste
question develpoped. Thus, he
understood a more favorable
resolution was essential to obtaining
mortgage financing. The trial court
also concluded Dr. Churgin's
attorney knew Dr. Hobbie wanted
additional time to meet the financing
condition and such knowledge
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removing the property from the real
estate market. However, the court
noted that it is still the prerogative of
the parties to establish a new
financing condition or to extend a
financing condition. Nevertheless,
such amendments or extensions
should be "express and not left to
implication from extension of the
date of performance of the contract."

Buyer didn't act in bad
faith or participate in
unfair practice

In ruling against Dr.
Hobbie, however, the appellate court
found that he had not acted in bad
faith. The court dismissed an unfair
practice claim against Dr. Hobbie,
arguing that he was "untutored in
the perils of the modem real estate
transaction, and unaware of the
potential difficulties that might arise
from even the possibility of toxic
pollution" on the property. "Ineptitude there may have been; bad faith
and unfair practice there was not.
Not every unlawful act is automati-

cally an unfair (or deceptive) one
under M.G.L.A. 93A §1."
This ruling reinforces a
well-grounded legal principle that
consumers in the real estate market
would be wise to heed: Assumption
is the mother of all mishaps, and the
home of true security in is found the
written document.

Allstate prevails in suit over exclusionary clauses
for uninsured motorist coverage
by Aaron R. Pettit

In Luechtefeld v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 N.E.2d
Allstate denied the claim, citing an exclusion1058 (I11. 1995), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
ary clause in the policy excluding uninsured-motorist
an exclusionary clause denying uninsured-motorist
coverage for vehicles the insured owned which had
coverage for vehicles owned by the insured, when such
uninsured-motorist coverage under another policy.
vehicles have uninsured-motorist coverage under
Allstate argued that this clause clearly excluded coveranother insurance policy, did not violate public policy.
age for the plaintiff's motorcycle accident because the
Perkin policy covered the motorcycle.
On December 10, 1990, the plaintiff, Harry
The plaintiff then brought a declaratory
Luechtefeld ("the plaintiff'), suffered personal injuries
when the motorcycle he was driving was struck by an
judgment action in the circuit court of St. Clair County,
uninsured motorist. The motorcycle was insured under a seeking a determination of his rights under the Allstate
policy. He claimed the exclusionary clause was ambigupolicy issued by Pekin Insurance Company ("Perkin"),
which provided uninsured motorist coverage with limits
ous and should therefore be construed against Allstate.
In addition, he asserted that the clause should be
of $20,000 per person. The plaintiff was also the named
unenforceable because it violated public policy. The trial
insured in a policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") to cover three automobiles the plaintiff court granted Allstate's motion for summary judgment,
finding that the policy unambiguously excluded the
owned. Since the plaintiff's damages exceeded the
plaintiffs claim. The appellate court reversed, finding
$20,000 limit on the Pekin policy, the plaintiff filed a
that the exclusion was invalid for public policy reasons
claim with Allstate, claiming that his injuries were
the clause was unambiguous.
covered under the uninsured-motorist provisions of the
The Illinois Supreme Court first rejected the
Allstate policy.
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